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II 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
John Matthew Lonkey from the judgment entered upon 
pleas to rap& and burglary. Lonkey claims the prosecutor breached 
agreement in making his sentencing recommendation and that the district court 
abused its sentencing discretion. 
Statement Of Facts And Course Of Proceedings 
Three days after being released from probation for second-degree 
stalking, Lonkey knocked on the door of a bar where T.S. worked as a bartender 
and asked if he could use the telephone, claiming he was having car trouble. 
(PSI, pp.3, 6, 10, 18.) When T.S. let him in, he asked her if she was available 
for sex and offered to pay her $300.00. (PSI, p.3.) When T.S. told Lonkey to 
leave, Lonkey "pulled a knife out of his pocket, pointed it at [T.S.]" and told her to 
put down the phone and told her he was going to have sex with her. (PSI, p.3.) 
Lonkey then forced T.S. into the bathroom where he vaginally raped T.S. after 
which he wiped his penis on T.S.'s "breast/bra." (PSI, p.3.) Lonkey also 
attempted to anally rape T.S. and threatened to rape her "a few more times after 
he recovered." (PSI, p.3.) 
Lonkey eventually left, throwing the cordless phone T.S. had when 
Lonkey first arrived, damaging it in the process. (PSI, p.3.) However, T.S. was 
able to use her cell phone to call 911. (PSI, p.3.) Lonkey attempted to re-enter 
the bar after he left, but was unsuecessful because T.S. had locked the doors 
before hiding in the office to wait for help. (PSI, pp.5, 20.) 
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Law enforcement released Lonkey's description to the media after which 
Lonkey's aunt called and reported that she believed Lonkey was the suspect law 
enforcement was seeking. (PSI, p.4.) Lonkey's aunt and stepfather reviewed 
surveillance footage from the bar and identified Lonkey as the perpetrator. (PSI, 
p.4.) A search of Lonkey's car and residence uncovered a recent receipt for 
condoms, a knife, and clothing that matched the clothing the suspect was 
wearing in the surveillance video. (PSI, p.4.) When interviewed, Lonkey denied 
any involvement but T.S. identified Lonkey in a photographic line-up. (PSI, p.4.) 
The state charged Lonkey with rape, burglary, use of a deadly weapon 
during the commission of a crime, and interference with a telephonic 
communication instrument. (R., pp.6-8, 30-32, 34-36.) Pursuant to a plea 
agreement, Lonkey pied guilty to rape and burglary and the state dismissed the 
weapons enhancement and the interference with a telephone communication 
device charge. (R., pp.47-48; Plea Tr., p.6, Ls.1-3, p.8, Ls.14-21.) The state 
also agreed to recommend concurrent sentences "with an aggregate 
recommendation of no more than 40 years." (Plea Tr., p.6, Ls.3-6.) Lonkey was 
free to "argue for anything less." (Plea Tr., p.6, Ls.6-7.) 
At sentencing, consistent with the plea agreement, the prosecutor said: 
"The State's agreed to a 40-year cap." (Sent. Tr., p.11, Ls.16-17.) The 
prosecutor subsequently said: 'The State's recommendations in keeping with 
what was negotiated by way of resolution in this matter is for a period of twenty 
years fixed in the State penitentiary, followed by twenty years indeterminate." 
(Sent. Tr., p.12, Ls.6-10.) The court imposed a unified life sentence with 25 
2 
years fixed for rape, a concurrent 10-year sentence with five years fixed for 
burgiary, and ordered Lonkey to pay restitution. (R., pp.60-61, 68-69.) Lonkey 




the State breach obligations under 
agreement by disavowing the plea agreement and impliedly 
recommending a sentence greater than it had agreed to 
recommend, thus depriving Mr. Lonkey of his right to due 
process of law? 
2. Did the district court abuse its discretion when it imposed an 
aggregate unified sentence of life, with twenty-five years 
fixed, upon Mr. Lonkey following his pleas of guilty to 
burglary and rape? 
(Appellant's Brief, p.4.) 
The state rephrases the issues on appeal as: 
1. Has Lonkey failed to show the prosecutor's unobjected-to comments at 
sentencing constituted a breach of the plea agreement, much less that the 
statements amounted to reversible fundamental error? 
2. Given the nature of the offense, Lonkey's history, and the demonstrated 
danger he presents to the community, has Lonkey failed to show the district 
court abused its discretion by imposing an aggregate life sentence with 25 years 




Lonkey Has Failed To Show Any Error Let Alone Fundamental Error In Relation 
To The Prosecutor's Sentencing Recommendation 
A. Introduction 
Lonkey asserts, for the first time on appeal, "the prosecutor severely 
undercut the agreed-upon [sentencing] recommendation" by "speculat[ing] that 
the victim would probably ask for the maximum sentence (life)." (Appellant's 
Brief, p.5.) Lonkey's claim fails. Lonkey has failed to show the prosecutor's 
statements at sentencing were improper much less that they resulted in 
fundamental error. 
B. Standard Of Review 
When raising an issue for the first time on appeal, including a claim that 
the prosecutor breached the plea agreement, the appellant must show 
fundamental error. State v. Stocks, 153 Idaho 171,174,280 P.3d 198,201 (Ct. 
App. 2012). 
C. Lonkey Has Failed To Establish The Prosecutor's Comments At 
Sentencing Were Error Much Less Fundamental Error 
Because Lonkey did not object to the prosecutor's sentencing 
recommendation, in order to be entitled to relief, he has the burden of showing 
the error he claims is fundamental. The fundamental error standard requires 
Lon key to show (1) a violation of a constitutional right, (2) error that is "clear or 
obvious, without the need for any additional information not contained in the 
appellate record, including information as to whether the failure to object was a 
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tacticai decision," and (3) the alleged error "affected [his] substantial rights, 
meaning (in most instances) that it must have affected the outcome of the trial 
proceedings." Stocks, 153 Idaho at 17 4, 280 P.3d at 201 (quoting State v. Perry, 
150 Idaho 209, 226, 245 P.3d 961, 978 (2010)). Lonkey has failed to satisfy any 
part of the fundamental error standard. 
Lonkey's claim fails under the first prong of fundamental error because 
the prosecutor's recommendation did not constitute a breach of the plea 
agreement. The plea agreement limited the state's recommendation to a 
maximum aggregate term of 40 years. (Plea Tr., p.6, Ls.3-6.) The prosecutor's 
actual recommendation was well within that limitation. The relevant portion of 
the prosecutor's comments at sentencing reads: 
The State's agreed to a 40-year cap. I think if this victim could 
articulate some other sentence, she would ask that there be the 
absolute maximum imposed and the defendant be directed to [the] 
Department of Corrections forthwith. I think that's consistent with 
my discussions of [sic] her. 
The recommendation that the State has under these 
egregious facts and the circumstances are as follows: We do ask 
that judgments of convictions [sic] enter as to each of those two 
felonies. I think the case is one which calls loudly for the imposition 
of a lengthy penitentiary sentence. 
And, further, one of the criterion under the code is whether a 
lesser sentence would be appropriate and otherwise would 
minimize the significance of this offense. The State's 
recommendations in keeping with what was negotiated by way of 
resolution in this matter is for a period of twenty years fixed in the 
State penitentiary, followed by twenty years indeterminate. 
(Sent. Tr., p.11, L.16 p.12, L.10.) 
On appeal, Lonkey contends the prosecutor's reference to the victim's 
desires, coupled with the prosecutor's statements regarding the egregious nature 
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of the facts and the need for a "lengthy penitentiary sentence" "effectively 
disavowed" the actual recommendation made and was an "[i]mplicit" request for 
a "life sentence."1 (Appellant's Brief, pp.9-10.) This argument is without merit. It 
is clear from the context of the prosecutor's statements that the victim's wish for 
the "maximum imposed" related to the "40-year cap" contemplated by the plea 
agreement, not the maximum imposed by law, which would be life, at least as to 
the rape charge. I.C. § 18-6104 (rape punishable up to life). With respect to the 
prosecutor's characterization of the facts as "egregious" and his assertion that 
the case "calls loudly for the imposition of a lengthy penitentiary sentence," 
nothing about either statement operates to disavow the agreed upon maximum 
recommendation of 40 years. A prosecutor is entitled to make a "vigorous 
argument" in support of his sentencing request. See, ~, Stocks, 153 Idaho at 
175, 280 P.3d at 202; State v. Halbesleben, 147 Idaho 161, 168, 206 P.3d 867, 
874 (Ct. App. 2009). Absent some basis for finding the prosecutor's argument 
was inconsistent with the agreed-upon recommendation, enthusiastically 
recommending the sentence authorized by the plea agreement does not 
constitute a breach. Halbesleben, 147 Idaho at 165, 206 P.3d at 871. Nothing 
in the prosecutor's statements in this case were inconsistent with his ability to 
1 Lonkey claims the prosecutor "endorsed" and "embraced" "a fictional 
recommendation by the victim." (Appellant's Brief, p.10.) Lonkey's basis for 
referring to the recommendation as "fictional" is unclear. It appears this may be 
based on a belief that the prosecutor was "speculat[ing]" about the victim's 
wishes. (See Appellant's Brief, p.5.) To the extent that is Lonkey's belief, it is 
unsupported by the record. The prosecutor explicitly said that his comment 
about the victim's wishes was based on his discussions with her. (Sent. Tr., 
p.11, Ls.20-21.) 
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recommend a maximum 40-year sentence nor did the prosecutor implicitly 
disavow the recommendation he made. Indeed, although the prosecutor had the 
ability to recommend up to 40 years fixed, which is apparently what the victim 
wanted, he did not. His recommendation was limited to 40 years with only 20 
fixed and his comments in support of that request were entirely appropriate. 
Lonkey's claim to the contrary fails. 
Lonkey's claim also fails on the second prong of the fundamental error 
test because the alleged breach is not clear or obvious. Even if the Court finds 
some ambiguity in the prosecutor's statement that the victim "would ask that 
there be the absolute maximum imposed," such that Lonkey's interpretation 
could be considered reasonable, the very fact that the statement is open to 
interpretation defeats any assertion that the alleged breach is clear or obvious. 
Further, because Lonkey's argument is premised on an implied violation, as 
opposed to a direct violation, the alleged error cannot be clear or obvious. 
Stocks, 153 Idaho at 174, 280 P.3d at 201 ("the requirement that a violation be 
'clear' all but definitively defeats a claim of an implied violation"). Lonkey has 
failed to satisfy the "clear or obvious" component of fundamental error. 
Finally, Lonkey's claim also fails on the third fundamental error prong 
because there is no basis for concluding the prosecutor's comments affected the 
sentence. Lonkey argues otherwise, contending the prosecutor's comments 
"may have" resulted in a longer sentence than the district court would have 
imposed absent the comments. (Appellant's Brief, p., 14.) No reading of the 
record or the court's rationale at sentencing supports Lonkey's argument. 
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Lonkey, three days after completing probation for second-degree stalking, 
threatened T.S. with a knife and forcibly ;aped her. The court's sentence was 
based on the "extreme risk" Lonkey poses to the community, the "serious nature 
of [his] crimes," and Lonkey's need for "correctional treatment." (Sent. Tr., p.17, 
L.10 - p.19, L.18.) Lonkey's argument that he "may have received a longer 
sentence" as a result of the prosecutor's comments is not only inconsistent with 
the actual legal standard, which requires him to show the error "must have 
affected the outcome," it is unsupported by the record. 
Because Lonkey has failed to show the prosecutor's sentencing 
recommendation constituted a breach of the plea agreement, much less that the 
error was fundamental, his claim fails. 
11. 
Lonkey Has Failed To Show The District Court Abused Its Sentencing Discretion 
A. Introduction 
Lonkey contends the district court abused its sentencing discretion "[i]n 
light of mitigating factors present in this case." (Appellant's Brief, p.15.) The 
record supports the sentence imposed. 
B. Standard Of Review 
"Where the sentence imposed by a trial court is within statutory limits, the 
appellant bears the burden of demonstrating that it is a clear abuse of 
discretion." State v. Miller, 151 Idaho 828, 834, 264 P.3d 935, 941 (2011) 
(quotations and citations omitted). "In deference to the trial judge, this Court will 
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not substitute its view of a reasonable sentence where reasonable minds might 
differ." Id. 
C. The District Court Did Not Abuse Its Sentencing Discretion 
"When reviewing the reasonableness of a sentence this Court will make 
an independent examination of the record, having regard to the nature of the 
offense, the character of the offender and the protection of the public interest." 
Miller, 151 Idaho at 834, 264 P.3d at 941 (quotations and citation omitted). A 
review of the record demonstrates that Lonkey's sentence is not excessive. 
Lonkey has failed to establish otherwise. 
The four objectives of sentencing are well-established. They a re "( 1) 
protection of society; (2) deterrence of the individual and the public generally; (3) 
the possibility of rehabilitation; and (4) punishment or retribution." State v. 
Knighton, 143 Idaho 318, 319-320, 144 P.3d 23, 24-25 (2006) (quotations and 
citations omitted). "A sentence need not serve all sentencing goals; one may be 
sufficient." State v. Sheahan, 139 Idaho 267, 285, 77 P.3d 956, 974 (2003) 
(citing State v. Waddell, 119 Idaho 238, 241, 804 P.2d 1369, 1372 (Ct. App. 
1991)). State v. Ozuna, 155 Idaho 697,705,316 P.3d 109, 117 (Ct. App. 2013) 
("The primary consideration is, and presumptively always will be, the good order 
and protection of society. All other factors are, and must be, subservient to that 
end."). 
Lonkey entered T.S.'s workplace under the false pretense that he needed 
to use the phone because he had car trouble and then proceeded to threaten 
T.S. with a knife and forcibly rape her. (PSI, p.3.) Lonkey had just been 
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released from probation three days earlier for an offense that bears disturbing 
similarities to this case. (PSI, pp.6, 10, 18.) Lon key had been on probation 
following a juvenile adjudication for second-degree stalking. The stalking charge 
was the result of Lonkey following a classmate and offering to pay her for sex. 
(PSI, p.8.) Lonkey's stalking victim reported hiding in the bathroom to avoid 
Lonkey. (PSI, p.8.) T.S. and Lonkey's stalking victim are not the only people 
who have been victims of Lonkey's criminal conduct. 
While on probation for stalking, police responded to a report that Lonkey 
left home with a knife following an altercation he had with his mother after she 
"returned home with her six-year-old daughter to find [Lonkey] masturbating on 
the couch." (PSI, p.8.) When one of the officers located Lonkey and 
approached him, Lonkey yelled, '"Fuck you,' stepped back, and removed a knife 
from his pocket." (PSI, p.8.) Lonkey "refused to comply with instructions to put 
down the knife." (PSI, p.8.) Lonkey was eventually arrested and charged with 
and adjudicated for misdemeanor assault or battery upon certain personnel. 
(PSI, pp.6-9.) 
Lonkey was later committed to the Idaho Department of Juvenile 
Corrections ("IDJC") after he violated his probation in the assault case by 
"following a car, [and] wrecking into it, with the intent of sexually assaulting the 
occupant." (PSI, p.9.) Lonkey presciently reported his "sexual urges" were 
"increasing" and he could "no longer control them." (PSI, p.9.) 
In imposing sentence the district court said: 
I read your presentence investigation. You are an extreme 
risk to the safety of the Homedale community and the state. 
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As the victim said here today, you invaded a life and you 
invaded that community. She will never be the same, and 
everyone who lives in that small community will remember you and 
what you did. 
(Sent. Tr., p.17, L.20 - p.18, L.1.) After considering the relevant sentencing 
objectives, Lonkey's history, and the nature of the offenses Lonkey committed in 
this case, the district court rightly determined a life sentence with 25 years fixed 
for the rape charge was appropriate. 2 
In arguing that the court abused its sentencing discretion, Lonkey asserts 
the district court failed to "properly consider[ ] his family support, remorse, and 
mental health issues." (Appellant's Brief, p.18.) Specifically, Lonkey claims he 
(1) "was previously successful on probation and that, with programming and 
supervision, [he] could likely be successful in the community," (2) "has the 
support of his family members," (3) is "remorseful, and expressed his regret 
regarding his conduct," and (4) has mental health issues. (Appellant's Brief, 
pp.15-18.) Lonkey's claim that the district court did not "properly consider" these 
factors and that any of these factors requires a lesser sentence is without merit. 
First, Lonkey's argument that he "was previously successful on probation" 
is inconsistent with the fact that he was committed to IDJC for violating his 
probation. While Lonkey characterizes his probation as a "success" because "he 
met with his probation officer as scheduled and attended treatment" (Appellant's 
Brief, pp.15-16), what his probation officer actually reported was: 
2 Lon key only challenges his sentence for rape and not the 10-year sentence 
imposed on the burglary charge. (See Appellant's Brief, p.15 (claiming "his 
unified sentence of life, with twenty-five years fixed, is excessive").) 
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He is very concerning. He was pretty nondescript when I 
supervised him. I watched him like a hawk. He met with me like he 
was supposed to and went to treatment. It was unusual for the 
DJC to commit someone without a sex offense for treatment, but 
because of his history he had sexual offender treatment almost two 
years. 
(PSI, pp.9-10.) The district court "properly" considered Lonkey's performance on 
probation when it imposed sentence. 
Second, while Lonkey's family supports him to the extent they "get along" 
and his mother has obtained counseling for him since a young age, his family 
also recognizes the danger Lonkey presents. (PSI, p.11.) Lonkey's mother 
advised that they had to place an alarm on Lonkey's door when he lived with 
them to '"[e]nsure the safety of the two other children."' (PSI, p.11.) Lonkey's 
mother also reported that Lonkey "definitely has to have a structured 
environment," which she defined as not necessarily "prison the rest of his life, but 
with probation and strict rules to follow once he gets into society." (PSI, p.11.) 
Given that the district court imposed a sentence that places Lonkey in a 
"structured environment" with a lifetime parole requirement if and when he is 
released from custody, it can hardly be said that the district court did not 
"properly consider" Lonkey's "family support[]." 
Third, contrary to Lonkey's claim on appeal, the district court "fully 
consider[ed]" Lonkey's claimed remorse and expressions of regret. (Appellant's 
Brief, p.16.) However, as noted by the court, what the record shows is primarily 
a lack of either. (Sent. Tr., p.18, Ls.2-7.) Although Lonkey said he was 
"confused on why [he] did it and totally ashamed" (PSI, p.6), he also said he 
could "not recall raping" T.S. (PSI, p.5.) 
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Finally, the district court expressly considered and recognized Lonkey's 
myriad of mental health issues but it could not "overlook the huge risk that 
[Lonkey is] to our society." (Sent. Tr., p.18, Ls.22-24.) The district court's 
overriding concern for the protection of society is both compelled by law, Ozuna, 
supra, and supported by Lonkey's history and continued criminal conduct despite 
the fact that he has received counseling and treatment since he was five years 
old (PSI, pp.10-11 ). The district court "properly" and "fully" considered this factor 
and all others relied on by Lonkey and determined that a unified life sentence 
with 25 years fixed is appropriate. That Lonkey has a different view of the weight 
to be given the "mitigating factors" in his case and believes a different sentence 
was warranted does not establish an abuse of discretion. 
Lonkey has failed to meet his burden of showing his sentence is 
excessive. 
CONCLUSION 
The state respectfully requests this Court affirm the district court's 
judgment and sentence entered upon Lonkey's guilty pleas to rape and burglary. 
DATED this 1 fh day of September 2014. 
JE~ 
Deputy Attorney General 
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